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Abstract 
A bias towards running deficits is an entrenched feature of fiscal policy making in most 
developed economies. Our paper examines whether this tendency is in any way associated 
with the personal distribution of income of a country. It takes inspiration from theoretical 
work according to which distributional conflicts may give rise to deficit spending or to 
delayed fiscal adjustment. Although these theories have been around for years the empirical 
literature on the determinants of fiscal performance has so far paid little or no attention to 
the possible role played by different degrees of income inequality. Our results suggest that 
this neglect was not justified. Using cross-country data we find evidence that a more 
unequal distribution of income can weigh on a country's fiscal performance. These findings 
can be relevant in the aftermath of the post-2007 global financial and economic crisis in 
particular when designing fiscal exist strategies. The success and sustainability of such 
strategies may inter alia depend on their distributional implications. 
 
 
 3
 
When that the poor have cried, Caesar hath wept 
William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III, Scene II 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the 1970s, fiscal policy making in a large number of OECD economies has run afoul 
of one central prediction of Barro's tax smoothing paradigm (1979), namely that budget 
balances would even out over time. Persistent deficits in peacetime, which over the years 
accumulated to sizeable levels of government debt, have become an entrenched feature of 
fiscal policy. On the back of these developments, a rich political economy literature has 
developed examining the determinants of fiscal profligacy. An early and comprehensive 
review of the respective branch of the literature is by Alesina and Perotti (1995).  
Among the competing models that seek to explain the persisting deficit bias two dominate 
the empirical literature and the political debate: fiscal illusion and (geographically) 
dispersed interests. Fiscal illusion, which includes the issue of political business cycles, 
essentially assumes that voters do not grasp that deficits will have to be financed by future 
tax increases or expenditure cuts. The model of dispersed interests is somewhat more 
involved. It is an application of the problem of 'fishing from a common pool', where 
political representatives, when assessing spending proposals, consider only the costs and 
benefits for their respective constituency ignoring the effect on the overall tax burden: the 
aggregate result is overspending. By now, the 'common pool' problem has become the main 
starting point of the growing strand of the literature examining ways to tackle the deficit 
bias. One of the first and particularly active scholars to empirically investigate the 
interaction between the 'common pool' problem of public finances and institutional 
arrangements that may mitigate the problem is von Hagen and his co-authors (see for 
instance von Hagen, 1992, von Hagen and Harden, 1994, and von Hagen and Poterba, 
1999).  
 4
Explanations other than the fiscal illusion and 'common pool' problem, in particular 
distributional conflicts and intergenerational redistribution, which are part of the standard 
repertoire of the political economy of the budget deficit, have, to our knowledge, inspired 
comparatively little or no empirical work. Our paper ventures into this less travelled road of 
the empirical literature and investigates the link between fiscal performance and income 
inequality. The basic idea underlying the models on which we stage our work is that 
political 'struggles' between different social groups, including the 'poor' and the 'rich' can 
delay fiscal adjustment towards balanced budgets and/or lead to the deliberate 
accumulation of debt to be born by future generations.  
Possible reasons why distributional conflicts and intergenerational distribution have so far 
received relatively little attention in the empirical literature dealing with the political 
economy of the budget deficit include: (i) data on income distribution are less readily 
available and potentially less reliable than other macroeconomic indicators; (ii) the 
relationship between income distribution and fiscal performance is likely to be complex in 
the sense that income inequality as such may not necessarily lead to overspending; rather it 
may involve a number of interactions with other variables such as political institutions and 
the prevailing value system; and (iii) more generally and importantly, issues of income 
distribution have for a long time been marginalized in mainstream economics. Only 
recently, after decades of increasing income inequality in developed countries and a visibly 
skewed distribution of income gains generated in boom periods – such as the ITC boom in 
the second half of the 1990s as well as the expansion of the financial industry up until the 
onset of the post-2007 global financial and economic crisis - the public eye and the 
economic profession are gradually rediscovering the personal distribution of income as a 
relevant economic issue. To take an example from the public debate that is particularly 
close to the topic of our paper, the view that income distribution may feed back onto fiscal 
policy was also hypothesised in the financial press.1 
                                                            
1 'There is little evidence that inequality affects the societies' desire for redistribution at the ballot box. 
However, there is evidence that if those in the middle of the income distribution feel greater affinity with the 
poor, democracies tend to vote for more redistribution';  Chris Giles in Financial Times, 16 December 2009, 
FT.COM: Social scars from an unequal crisis. 
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Against this background, our empirical analysis concentrates on the relationship between 
fiscal performance and income inequality. Our prior is that income inequality may give rise 
to stronger distributional conflicts which in turn can lead to some kind of 'soothing' increase 
in spending unmatched by revenue increases. The results of our analysis warrant 
conclusions that complement the conventional lessons about how to deal with the deficit 
bias. In fact, we find evidence that income inequality can weigh on public finances through 
various channels. In particular, income inequality seems to dampen the effect of economic 
growth on the budget. As a result, income inequality can hamper fiscal discipline and 
adjustment.  
Admittedly, we do not expect distributional conflicts or income distribution to be the 
dominant determinant of the deficit bias or for that matter to be more important than the 
'common pool' problem. However, we argue that the distribution of income can and is 
playing a significant role, a role that so far has been overlooked and that is likely to be of 
importance ahead of the prospective fiscal adjustment process aimed at correcting the 
dismal and unsustainable fiscal situation that has build up in the wake of the post-2007 
global financial and economic crisis. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews models in the 
political economy literature that postulate or imply that distributional conflicts or income 
inequality may lead to excessive spending and to an accumulation of debt. Section 3 
describes our data set and, based on a simple analysis of variance, presents a number of 
stylized facts concerning fiscal performance, social conflicts and income distribution. 
Section 4 discussed the results of panel regressions that examine the link between fiscal 
performance as measured by the budget balance to GDP ratio and indicators of personal 
income distribution while controlling for other possible determinants of the budget balance. 
Section 5 discusses policy implications of our empirical findings and concludes. 
 
2. The political economy of the budget deficit: the role of distributional conflicts 
As highlighted eloquently by Atkinson (1997), the analysis of personal income distribution 
has for a long time not been at the core of main stream or modern neoclassical economics: 
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it was, to use his own words, out in the cold. Allocation and efficiency have 'naturally' 
dominated the focus of attention. Income inequality was largely considered to be a social or 
political issue. The only area of modern neoclassical economics that has consistently 
addressed issues of income distribution is growth theory, and related to that, development 
economics. A particularly striking piece of evidence for the relative neglect of main-stream 
economics vis-à-vis income inequality is that hardly any of the widely used macroeconomic 
textbooks on the market features sections on the possible interactions between income 
distributions and key macroeconomic variables. 
Nonetheless, there is one branch of the economic literature, where the distribution of 
income has typically featured somewhat more prominently: public choice or political 
economy. The analysis of how the interplay between conflicting interests and collective 
decision making shapes economic outcomes naturally includes a branch where the 
heterogeneity across individuals is in the level of income. It examines how varying degrees 
of income inequality can affect economic policy making and, in turn, economic outcomes. 
Overall, the variety of political economy models involving income distribution can be 
divided into two broad groups.  
The first focuses on the redistribution of pre-tax income via the political process. The key 
questions addressed by this class of models is when and how the political process generates 
tax and transfer programs that lead to a re-distribution of income across the currently alive 
generations, typically but not necessarily, from the rich to the poor. Prominent examples are 
Meltzer and Richards (1981) and Dixit and Londregan (1996). One prime conclusion of this 
type of research is that an unequal income distribution (as measured by the median voter's 
relative income) will produce the necessary political majority in favour of redistributive 
expenditure and tax programmes; more specifically, the more unequal the distribution of 
income the higher the level of redistributive spending.  
Obviously, redistribution per se does not necessarily entail fiscal profligacy, as 
governments can well implement redistribution with balanced budgets. However, there is a 
possible interaction between the degree of redistribution and economic growth that may 
make the balancing of the budget more difficult when redistribution is large. In particular, 
Bertola (1993) and Person and Tabellini (1994) have, among others, argued that 
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redistributive spending will affect growth because of the distortive effect of taxation and 
the crowding out of investment. On this basis, one could reasonably hypothesise that in a 
more unequal society with higher demand for redistributive spending lower economic 
growth may complicate the government process aimed at accommodating competing claims 
on the budget as compared to a more equal society with lower redistributive spending and 
higher growth. 
In the second group of political economy models involving income inequality the focus is 
less on the determinants of traditional redistributive policies. Rather, the heterogeneity 
across individuals in the level of income represents an element that may affect macro 
outcomes, including fiscal performance. Very often the main difference compared to the 
first group of models is an intergenerational dimension where income inequality can lead to 
redistribution from living to future generations by running government deficits and 
accumulating debt.  
Cuckierman and Meltzer (1989), for instance, developed a framework where poor and 
liquidity constrained households want to run government deficits while rich households can 
adjust their economic plans to any fiscal policy profile. In a similar vein, Tabellini (1991) 
proposes a setup where debt is accumulated because future generations are not present 
when new government debt is issued. Government debt is nonetheless honoured because 
the old and the children of the wealthy (who hold a large quantity of the debt) chose to do 
so.  
Beyond the intergenerational framework, distributional conflicts can affect fiscal 
performance also by delaying necessary reforms. It is a fact of modern political life that a 
multitude of social and political constraints hampers and defers the implementation of 
reform programs, such as fiscal consolidation, even when the economic case is clear and 
compelling. One of the main and, after all, evident findings of the relatively rich literature 
on inaction and delay is that procrastination is a function of how the costs of reform are 
distributed: the more unequal the distribution of the costs of reform the stronger the 
resistance to change. This point is for instance made by Alesina and Drazen (1991) in 
connection with fiscal stabilization. Using a war of attrition model, they show that (i) 
struggles among social groups over the distribution of the required fiscal adjustment delays 
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the consolidation effort and (ii) the delay increases if the consolidation programme is 
'inequitable'. Distributional aspects feature even more prominently in the model of delayed 
fiscal stabilisation by Hsieh (1997) where workers bargain with capitalists over the 
respective share of the adjustment costs. 
In spite of the relatively rich theoretical political economy literature involving issues of 
income distribution or distributional conflicts there are, to our knowledge, very few 
empirical studies examining in a systematic way the possible link between income 
distribution and fiscal policy performance. In the empirical macro literature, the distribution 
of personal income has, together with a plethora of other candidates, been mainly examined 
as potential determinant of economic growth in cross-country growth regressions. A useful 
review of that type of research, which boomed in 1990s, and unambiguously concludes that 
inequality reduces economic growth, is provided in Aghion et al. (1999). Empirical studies 
closer to the economic policy models discussed above do exist but generally try to establish 
whether and how income inequality affects the size of government or the composition of 
government expenditure; see for instance Perotti (1996). By contrast, the question of 
whether inequality may lead to higher deficits and, in turn, to a stronger accumulation of 
debt has not been investigated so far. 
3. Our dataset(s) 
Our dataset covers over 30 middle-income and industrial countries, mostly OECD 
members, over the period 1960-2008 and comprises three different types of data: data on 
income inequality, national accounts including fiscal variables and data on political and 
societal institutions. The choice of countries was essentially dictated by availability of 
public finance data. A list of the countries covered and a detailed description of all the 
variables used plus their respective source is provided in the Annex. 
While quality is a pervasive issue with all kinds of data, it is thought to be particularly 
severe for measures of the personal distribution of income. Reflecting, among other things, 
the relative inattention devoted to the subject of income distribution by the economic 
profession and, more generally, by politics in developed countries, there is no commonly 
agreed methodological basis for the construction of distribution data. In spite of some 
recent progress in the EU and the OECD the availability of comparable data is still limited. 
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All existing secondary datasets covering a sufficiently long period of time and a sufficiently 
large cross-section of countries suffer, to varying degrees, from the same type of caveat: the 
comparison of income inequality across time and countries is hampered by methodological 
breaks, differences in coverage, units of reference and or/income concept. The 
corresponding pitfalls have been examined in the literature; for a very comprehensive 
discussion see Atkinson and Brandolini (2001). 
Our approach to dealing with the likely quality issues of distribution data is to carry out our 
empirical analysis for a series of common and readily available secondary data sets, in 
particular, the 2008-update of the UNU-WIDER database, the data-set constructed by 
Deininger and Squire (1996), figures from the Luxembourg Income Data project (LIS), the 
OECD and EUROSTAT. 
Evidently, the main idea of our approach is to check the robustness of our results across 
alternative sources of distribution data. This tactic may not be fail-safe, as alternative data 
sources may share common problems. However, it gives us a higher degree of confidence 
compared to existing studies involving distribution data that rely on one secondary data source 
only. 
Among the alternative measures of income inequality (Gini coefficient, quintile, decile, or 
percentile group shares) we concentrate on the Gini-coefficient as it offers the broadest 
coverage across time and countries across the different sources considered. The exception is the 
OECD dataset where the 9th to the 1st decile ratio allows for a larger coverage compared to the 
Gini-coefficient. 
The availability of Gini coefficients within the individual datasets is uneven both across time 
and countries, especially in the 1960s, the 1970s and to some extent also in the 1980s. 
Consecutive annual figures are generally available only from the early 1990s onward. A 
detailed description of the time and cross-section dimension of the different distribution 
datasets is provided the Annex. 
The by far most comprehensive set of figures is the one provided by the 2008-update of the 
UNU-WIDER project. For the 35 countries considered in our study it offers more than 2300 
Gini estimates over the period 1960-2008. The large number of observations is explained by the 
fact that UNU-WIDER collects estimates from a whole variety of different sources, which 
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means that in many years more than one estimate per country is provided. Hence, when 
constructing our panel we had to discriminate among the available figure in individual years. 
As the source of the alternative estimates changes across time, within countries and across 
countries our choice could only be heuristic. Nevertheless, we followed the following principle: 
whenever possible we chose estimates that are based on disposable income, for which 
households are the recipient unit and that provide for a full coverage of the population. No 
selection of alternative estimates was necessary for the other distribution datasets, as they 
provide only one inequality measure for a given year in a given country.2  
Surprisingly or not, the inequality measures from different sources tend to be strongly 
correlated. Except for the OECD decile ratios, cross-correlations are close or above 0.8. The 
relatively weak co-movement of the decile ratios with respect to the Gini coefficients may be 
explained by the fact that (i) the former capture only a part of the distributional spectrum while 
the latter represents a synthetic measure of the entire distribution and (ii) the income concept 
underlying the decile ratios is gross earnings as opposed to disposable income for the other four 
datasets. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
Our empirical analysis aimed at testing the link between fiscal performance and personal 
income distributions proceeds in two steps. We first take a preliminary look at the data 
performing some simple statistical inference to find out whether countries with an, on 
average, more uneven distribution of income exhibit statistically significant differences 
with regard to fiscal, political and macroeconomic variables compared to countries with a 
more even distribution of income. 
After that we proceed to a more involved statistical examination of how a country's 
personal distribution of income may impact on fiscal performance controlling for a range of 
other potential determinants of fiscal performance and possible interactions among them. 
                                                            
2 This is not entirely true for the Deininger Squire (1996) set, which in some cases offers multiple estimates 
for a given year and country. However, the 'over-determination' can be avoided by selecting the estimates 
marked as 'accept' indicating a high data quality. 
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Analysis of variance: comparing means 
An admittedly crude but still useful way to commence our empirical examination is a one-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA). To that end we first divide our sample into two groups 
using the average Gini coefficient as discriminators. We then compare means across the 
groups to check whether they exhibit statistically significant differences with respect to 
variables of interest, notably fiscal performance as measured by the average budget-
balance-to-GDP ratio, average social spending, and some political features such as the 
frequency of elections, political affiliation of the government, the prevailing degree of 
economic freedom etc. 
Table 1: Equal versus unequal distribution of income - comparing means 
UNU-WIDER inequality measures (Gini coefficients)
1960-2008
GINI 
above 
average
Gini 
below 
average
Test for 
equality
Code Variables Mean Count Mean Count Total prob. 
Value
BB Budget balance (% of GDP) -2.64 172 -1.96 376 548 0.08
SS Social Spending (% of GDP) 13.80 119 16.27 313 432 0.00
EXECR Political orientation of government  (left=-1, 0=centre, 1=right 0.16 241 -0.10 418 659 0.00
MAJ Margin of majority 0.52 227 0.59 433 660 0.00
GOVSP Largest party of government with special interests (Dummy) 0.04 254 0.14 450 704 0.00
HERFGO Herfindhal Index of Government 0.79 227 0.68 433 660 0.00
ECOFR Economic freedom (index) 6.41 259 6.77 427 686 0.00
BNKV1052 Number of anti-government demonstrations 1.14 307 0.72 449 756 0.01
SFTPUHVL Number of major political crises, conflicts 1.42 307 0.46 454 761 0.00
STABS Number of veto players leaving office 0.13 229 0.13 426 655 0.80
LEGEL Legislative elections (Dummy) 0.27 253 0.27 435 688 0.99
FR Fiscal rules (index) 0.21 81 0.10 243 324 0.42
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Deininger and Squire (1997) inequality measures (Gini coefficients - quality score=accept)
1960-1996
GINI 
above 
average
Gini 
below 
average
Test for 
equality
Code Variables Mean Count Mean Count Total prob. Value
BB Budget balance (% of GDP) -4.28 67 -3.39 71 138 0.23
SS Social Spending (% of GDP) 11.44 49 14.37 62 111 0.00
EXECR Political orientation of government  (left=-1, 0=centre, 1=right 0.27 96 -0.21 115 211 0.00
MAJ Margin of majority 0.54 89 0.65 115 204 0.00
GOVSP Largest party of government with special interests (Dummy) 0.00 99 0.08 118 217 0.00
HERFGO Herfindhal Index of Government 0.85 89 0.75 115 204 0.01
ECOFR Economic freedom (index) 5.87 107 6.31 101 208 0.00
BNKV1052 Number of anti-government demonstrations 1.07 118 1.27 154 272 0.50
SFTPUHVL Number of major political crises, conflicts 0.38 118 1.22 154 272 0.01
STABS Number of veto players leaving office 0.13 84 0.13 108 192 0.97
LEGEL Legislative elections (Dummy) 0.31 98 0.29 117 215 0.81
FR Fiscal rules (index) -0.57 9 -0.79 19 28 0.43
 
OECD inequality measures (decile ratios - D9/D1)
1970-2008
GINI above 
average
Gini 
below 
average
Test for 
equality
Code Variables Mean Count Mean Count Total prob. Value
BB Budget balance (% of GDP) -1.77 156 -1.54 216 372 0.55
SS Social Spending (% of GDP) 13.61 140 17.72 185 325 0.00
EXECR Political orientation of government  (left=-1, 0=centre, 1=right) 0.09 158 0.08 232 390 0.86
MAJ Margin of majority 0.54 159 0.55 238 397 0.15
GOVSP Largest party of government with special interests (Dummy) 0.01 162 0.10 240 402 0.00
HERFGO Herfindhal Index of Government 0.86 159 0.62 238 397 0.00
ECOFR Economic freedom (index) 6.57 178 6.70 204 382 0.21
BNKV1052 Number of anti-government demonstrations 1.65 109 0.46 206 315 0.00
SFTPUHVL Number of major political crises, conflicts 1.19 109 0.27 206 315 0.00
STABS Number of veto players leaving office 0.10 157 0.14 234 391 0.09
LEGEL Legislative elections (Dummy) 0.31 162 0.27 240 402 0.44
FR Fiscal rules (index) 0.15 65 0.51 107 172 0.03
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Luxembourg income study inequality measures (Gini coefficients)
(1967-2005)
GINI 
above 
average
Gini 
below 
average
Test for 
equality
Code Variables Mean Count Mean Count Total
prob. 
Value
BB Budget balance (% of GDP) -2.62 54 -1.67 71 125 0.23
SS Social Spending (% of GDP) 11.59 48 18.18 61 109 0.00
EXECR Political orientation of government  (left=-1, 0=centre, 1=right -0.05 62 -0.01 83 145 0.81
MAJ Margin of majority 0.54 64 0.57 86 150 0.12
GOVSP Largest party of government with special interests (Dummy) 0.02 65 0.18 88 153 0.00
HERFGO Herfindhal Index of Government 0.79 64 0.59 86 150 0.00
ECOFR Economic freedom (index) 7.01 64 6.88 79 143 0.40
BNKV1052 Number of anti-government demonstrations 1.08 50 0.99 85 135 0.83
SFTPUHVL Number of major political crises, conflicts 2.46 50 0.19 81 131 0.01
STABS Number of veto players leaving office 0.15 64 0.08 85 149 0.09
LEGEL Legislative elections (Dummy) 0.23 65 0.25 87 152 0.75
FR Fiscal rules (index) -0.32 23 0.13 43 66 0.09
 
EUROSTAT inequality measures (Gini coefficients)
1995-2008
GINI 
above 
average
Gini 
below 
average
Test for 
equality
Code Variables Mean Count Mean Count Total prob. Value
BB Budget balance (% of GDP) -2.02 110 0.02 129 239 0.00
SS Social Spending (% of GDP) 16.28 94 19.70 116 210 0.00
EXECR Political orientation of government  (left=-1, 0=centre, 1=right) -0.05 86 -0.17 99 185 0.35
MAJ Margin of majority 0.54 92 0.57 101 193 0.08
GOVSP Largest party of government with special interests (Dummy) 0.13 92 0.23 101 193 0.08
HERFGO Herfindhal Index of Government 0.80 92 0.52 101 193 0.00
ECOFR Economic freedom (index) 7.28 93 7.02 102 195 0.01
BNKV1052 Number of anti-government demonstrations 0.55 62 0.24 116 116 0.09
SFTPUHVL Number of major political crises, conflicts 0.46 61 0.00 48 109 0.32
STABS Number of veto players leaving office 0.17 92 0.09 101 193 0.04
LEGEL Legislative elections (Dummy) 0.26 92 0.24 101 193 0.71
FR Fiscal rules (index) 0.23 107 0.75 119 226 0.01
 
The results of the means comparison, which on the whole do not include big surprises, can 
be summarised as follows. As regards fiscal policy, the key thing to note is that countries 
with a lower-than-average score of income inequality tend to record lower budget deficits 
and a higher share of social spending in total government expenditure. This result is 
consistent for all the five sources of distribution data considered, but the difference 
concerning the budget deficit is not always statistically significant.  
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Turning to political factors, we find that an above-average degree of income inequality 
tends to be associated with a prevalence of centre-right governments, with a stronger degree 
of political concentration in government, and with governments that represent a wider 
spectrum of interests.  
The mean comparison based on the index of Economic Freedom is less conclusive. For 
three out of the five data sources a lower-than average degree of income inequality is 
associated with a higher score of economic freedom; in two cases it is the other way round. 
A somewhat clearer picture emerges with respect to measures of political instability. The 
number of anti-government protests or the number of major political crises/conflicts or both 
turn out to significantly discriminate between countries with a below or above average 
inequality score. Specifically, political instability is more frequent in more unequal 
societies.  
 
5. Panel regressions  
The distribution and redistribution of income involve complex economic, social and 
political processes. In the following we do not pretend to unveil the intricacies and details 
of how different degrees of inequality may affect aggregate fiscal performance. Our aim is 
to throw light on a number of aggregate channels associated with the predictions of the 
theoretical literature reviewed above. More specifically, we take a look at the following set 
of issues/questions: 
(i) Does inequality always produce pressure on public finances or does it work via a 
specific political affiliation of government? This question is based on the presumption 
that inequality is likely to interact with prevailing political constellations or prevailing 
societal values: societies where a majority trusts in the virtues and opportunities of the 
free market may tend to accept a more unequal distribution of income as opposed to 
societies where a majority accepts the need to correct market outcomes through fiscal 
policy interventions. 
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(ii) Does political or social instability play a role? In this case the underlying 
consideration is rather straightforward. A more unequal distribution of income can be 
assumed to translate into a deterioration of the government's fiscal balance when 
combined with political instability. Faced with ‘pressure from the streets’ policy makers 
may be inclined to respond quickly by running deficits. By contrast, an unequal 
distribution of income coupled with political stability may allow for a more reasoned 
fiscal policy.  
(iii) To the extent that inequality matters for fiscal performance, what is the interaction 
with economic growth? Does a more unequal distribution have a systematic effect on 
how additional public resources generated by economic growth impact on the budget 
balance? Conceivably, governments facing a more unequal distribution of income may 
find it more difficult to entirely assign additional revenues to the improvement of public 
finances. 
We approach these issues/questions by running reduced-form panel regressions using the 
following class of specifications. 
(1)  ∑ ∑ +++++= −
j j
tititijjtitijjtiiti zxzxbcb ,,,,,1,, εγγβα  
tib ,  measures the budget-balance-to-GDP ratio of country i in year t, tijx , stands for the 
realisation of explanatory variable j of country i in year t, tilz ,  denotes the measure of 
income inequality, i.e. the Gini coefficient or the decile ratios, and ti,ε  represents an 
independent and identically-distributed random effect. The country-specific constant ic  
captures country-fixed effects.  
The explanatory variables x and z enter equation (1) in two different ways: in an additive 
and a multiplicative fashion. The additive terms ∑ +
j
titijj zx ,, γβ  are meant to capture the 
individual effects on fiscal performance whereas the multiplicative terms ∑
j
titijj zx ,,γ  are 
expected to capture likely interactions notably between inequality z and other determinates 
of fiscal performance x. Interaction terms can be interpreted as kind of slope dummies 
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where the effect an explanatory variable x brings to bear on the independent variable 
depends on a third mediating factor. In our case this mediating factor of interest is the 
distribution of income.  
The total effect of a variable jx  on fiscal performance as measured by the budget-balance-
to-GDP ratio ib  can be written as tijtijj xz ,, )( γβ +  where on top of the direct effect 
captured by the coefficient jβ  there is a second component tij z ,γ  the size of which depends 
on whether the measure of income distribution is low or high, generally indicating a more 
equal or unequal distribution of income.3  
The detailed results of our panel regressions are summarised in Table 2, which is divided 
into five sections. Each section refers to one of the alternative sets of distribution data 
discussed in Section 3 (i.e. UNU-WIDER, Deininger and Squire (DS), LIS, OECD and 
EUROSTAT) and contains at least two alternative specifications of equation (1): a basic 
specification without interaction terms and a more involved specification including 
interactions. The number of observations and the time period are not constant. They are 
mainly a function of the availability of the distribution data which varies considerably 
across sources. 
On top of the inequality measure (i.e. Gini coefficient or decile ratio) the explanatory 
variables included in the basic specifications are the lagged budget-balance-to-GDP ratio, 
real GDP growth as a measure of cyclical conditions, an indicator capturing aspects of 
political (in)stability, a synthetic indicator of economic freedom (which covers areas such 
as personal choice, voluntary exchange coordinated by markets, freedom to enter and 
compete in markets, protection of persons and their property from aggression by others) 
and legislative elections. A more detailed definition of the political and institutional 
variables used in our regression analysis is provided in the Annex.  
                                                            
3 The main difference compared to actual slope dummies is that the moderating or accelerating factor z is not 
a binary but a metric variable. 
 17
Apart from the availability of data, our choice of explanatory variables was inspired by the 
existing empirical literature which has established a number of factors that turned out to 
play a statistically significant role across different studies.4 
The lagged dependent variable is mainly included for econometric reasons, so as to capture 
the considerable degree of inertia in the budget balance, and should not be interpreted as 
capturing the state of public finances strictu sensu. Ideally, one would like to assess 
prevailing fiscal conditions by means of the debt-to GDP ratio and possibly expect a 
negative relationship in the sense that a higher degree of indebtedness may induce policy 
makers to reduce the deficit in order to safeguard the long-term sustainability of public 
finances. However, comparable figures on the gross liabilities of general government are 
not available for a reasonably long time period and a reasonably broad cross section of 
countries. 
                                                            
4 Examples of this growing body of the empirical literature are Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2002), Buti 
and van den Noord (2003), Gali and Perotti (2001), Manasse (2006) and European Commission (2006). 
 18
Table 2: Panel regressions 
 
Unbalanced panels. GLS estimation with country fixed effects and White cross-section weights.
b(-1) 0.71 0.42 0.69 0.69 0.47 0.63 0.74 0.73 0.81 0.70 0.74 0.74 0.65 0.61 0.57 0.69 0.69 0.63 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.41
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
GINI(-1) -0.07 -0.18 0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 0.03 0.05 0.07 -0.05 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.93 0.73 2.17 2.12 3.73 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.10
(0.01)  (0.03) (0.53) (0.56)  (0.60) (0.64) (0.43) (0.33) (0.54)  (0.81) (0.14) (0.14)  (0.44) (0.40)  (0.64) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.09) (0.31)  (0.15) (0.35)  (0.27)
dlog(GDP) 31.63 36.02 94.86 94.16 104.87 26.10 18.01 3.13 18.48 39.77 107.42 107.83 151.55 35.83 25.12 103.67 101.24 110.39 25.16 27.47 58.4 60.75
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.79) (0.96) (0.16)  (0.08)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.22)  (0.00) (0.13)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.51) (0.47)
dlog(GDP(-1)) 10.07 18.67  -  -  - 16.00  -  - 13.44 10.24  -  -  - 21.35 28.17  -  -  - 33.19 20.85  -  -
(0.06)  (0.04) (0.06) (0.50)  (0.53)  (0.00)  (0.01)  -  -  -  (0.00)  (0.04)
ECOFR(-1) 0.81  - 0.75 0.75  - 0.33  -  - -0.38  -  -  -  - 0.08  -  -  -  - 0.91  - - -
 (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.40) (0.62) (0.78)  (0.00)
FR  - 0.72  -  - 0.62  -  -  -  - -0.24  -  - -0.47  - 0.46  -  - 0.39  - 0.57  - 0.31
(0.01) (0.02)  (0.71)  (0.61)  (0.12) (0.25)  (0.01)  (0.30)
LEGEL(-1) -0.04 -0.27 -0.24 -0.24 -0.46 0.02  -  - -0.33  - -0.7 -0.7 -2.59 -0.22 -0.48 -0.23 -0.22 -0.55  -  - 0.21 0.15
(0.84)  (0.52) (0.33) (0.33)  (0.27) (0.92) (0.56) (0.16) (0.17)  (0.02) (0.35)  (0.41) (0.38) (0.40)  (0.30) (0.31)  (0.52)
GOVSP(-1)*EXECR(-1)*GINI(-1)  -  - 0.08 0.08 0.04  - 0.08 0.08  -  - 0.06 0.06 0.10  -  - 0.95 0.95 0.68  -  - 0.02 0.03
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.07) (0.08)  (0.00)  -  - (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.07)
SFTPUHVL(-1) 0.04 0.11 0.15 0.16 5.42 0.11  -  - 0.01 -0.66 1.6 1.61 11.56 0.02 -0.02  -  -  -  -  -  -  -
(0.35)  (0.47) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.09) (0.28) (0.91)  (0.00) (0.12) (0.12) (0.69) (0.60)  (0.89)
BNKV1052(-1)  -  -  -  -  -  - 1.27 1.45  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 1.85 1.80 2.30  -  - 2.69 2.68
(0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)  (0.22) (0.04)  (0.04)
SFTPUHVL(-1)*GINI(-1)  -  - -0.00 -0.00 -0.16  -  -  -  -  - -0.04 -0.04 -0.37  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -
(0.14) (0.14)  (0.09) (0.12) (0.12)  (0.67)
BNKV1052(-1)*GINI(-1)  -  -  -  -  -  - -0.04 -0.04  -  -  -  -  -  -  - -0.59 -0.57 -0.74  -  - -0.08 -0.09
(0.04) (0.05) (0.11) (0.10)  (0.22) (0.06)  (0.05)
dlog(GDP)*GINI(-1)  -  - -1.87  - -2.18  - 0.47  -  -  - -2.56  - -3.82  -  - -19.87  - -21.85  -  - -0.56 -0.63
 (0.00)  (0.08) (0.80)  (0.00)  (0.41) (0.05)  (0.08) (0.82)  (0.80)
dlog(GDP)*GINI(-1)*DPG  -  -  - -1.81  -  -  - 0.51  -  -  - -2.6  -  -  -  - -17.94  -  -  -  -  -
 (0.00) (0.78)  (0.00) (0.03)
dlog(GDP)*GINI(-1)*DNG  -  -  - -1.95  -  -  - 2.33  -  -  - -2.55  -  -  -  - -22.2  -  -  -  -  -
 (0.00) (0.33)  (0.00) (0.04)
Number of observations 343 1496 330 330 188 99 102 102 91 48 91 91 48 232 114 244 244 110 193 203 115 114
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.06 1.66 2.05 2.05 1.61 1.95 2.15 2.18 0.65 1.81 0.89 0.88 1.89 2.23 2.59 2.2 2.21 2.50 2.11 1.86 2.32 2.28
Notes: (1) for OECD the inequality measure is the decile ratio (D9/D1). Numbers in brackets are p-values.
b=budget balance to GDP ratio; ECOFR= index of economic freedom; LEGEL= legislative election (dummy); GOVSP= largest government party with special interests (dummy); EXECR= political orientation of government (-1=left, 0=center, 1=right); BNKV1052= number of anti-government protests; SFTPUHVL= number 
of political conflicts/crises; DPG= 1 if positive real GDP growth and 0 otherwise; DNP= 1 if negative real GDP growth and 0 otherwise. A more detailed description of the political variables is provided in the Annex.
Luxembourg Income studyDeininger and Squire
Sets of distribution data
UNU-WIDER EUROSTATOECD(1)
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Our indicator of cyclical conditions - real GDP growth - is not standard. Most empirical 
studies examining the determinants of fiscal performance use output gap estimates, that is 
the difference between actual and potential output expressed in percent of potential GDP. 
However, output gap estimates are typically surrounded by a high degree of uncertainty. In 
particular, estimates available in real time, that is when governments adopt the budget, 
differ significantly from those available ex post, because they involve expectations about 
future output growth. As these forecasts are revised and actual data become available 
output gap estimates change. Such changes tend to be large and significantly alter the 
assessment of cyclical conditions. Forni and Momigliano (2004), for instance, have shown 
that ex-post output gap estimates have a weaker explanatory power than those underpinning 
actual fiscal policy decisions. 
In spite of their superiority, the availability of real-time output gap estimates is generally 
limited in time. Sets of comparable real-time estimates that can be used in panel 
regressions, are available only since the mid-1990s. In light of this limitation we decided to 
use actual growth as a proxy for cyclical conditions. 
Most explanatory variables enter our regression equation in lagged form. As regards the 
measure of income inequality this is to avert potential endogeneity issues that may arise 
from a simultaneous feedback of fiscal policy in the sense that changes in the budget 
balance in year t may have a contemporaneous redistributive effect. The lag for the other 
explanatory variables is motivated by the fact that the budget balance in year t is largely 
determined by the approval of the budget law which typically occurs towards the end of the 
previous year. Hence, the conditions prevailing around the time the budget is adopted are 
likely to impact on fiscal outcomes in the reporting year of the budget. 
Overall, the regression results relating to the basic specifications, i.e. without interaction 
terms, are rather inconclusive. Among the independent variables considered, only real GDP 
growth is consistently significant at standard levels of confidence and has the expected size 
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and positive sign.5 By contrast, the statistical quality and sign of the estimated coefficients 
of the other explanatory variables varies considerably. This is also and in particular true for 
the measure of income inequality. Only two out of the five different sets of distribution data 
give rise to coefficients the algebraic sign of which is in line with our prior, namely 
negative; and only one of the negative coefficients is statistically significant. The estimated 
coefficient of the election dummy has mostly the expected negative algebraic sign but is 
never statistically significant. Results are equally mixed as regards the variables gauging 
political (in)stability and economic freedom.  
While not particularly encouraging per se, the weak evidence in favour of a negative direct 
relationship between fiscal performance and income inequality emerging from the basic 
specifications does not necessarily imply that such a relationship does not exist; on the 
contrary. As hypothesised above, it may simply be an indication that a purely additive 
arrangement of explanatory variable does not do justice to the more complex interplay 
between the distribution of income on the one hand and political and economic variables on 
the other.  
This conjecture is corroborated by the regression results for the more complex 
specifications that explicitly allow for interaction terms. The pattern is much more 
consistent for the different sets of distribution data and the overall statistical quality of the 
estimates improves. The results confirm a weak and statistically insignificant direct impact 
of the income indicator measures on the budget balance. However, they provide fairly 
robust evidence that the distribution of income can have an impact through more circuitous 
ways in combination with other variables. The robustness of our results is strengthened by 
the fact, that our different sets of distribution data cover different time periods as well as 
slightly different groups of countries.6 
                                                            
5 The estimated coefficient(s), specifically the sum of the coefficient for contemporaneous and lagged real 
GDP growth, are broadly in line with the standard sensitivity of the government budget with respect to GDP, 
which in the EU averages at around 0.5.  
6 To 'iron out' possible breaks in the UNU-Wider series, we have also run regressions using moving averages 
of lagged Gini coefficients. The main findings turn out to be robust with respect to this adjustment. 
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To start with, we find an interesting interaction with the political colour and the political 
focus of government. According to this interaction, the distribution of income impacts 
negatively on fiscal performance only in the presence of two specific political factors: a 
government representing the left political spectrum and the largest government party 
representing special interests.7 It is worth stressing that income inequality tends to 
deteriorate a country's fiscal position only when both conditions are met; taken individually 
neither the political colour nor the special interest of the largest government seem to 
produce statistically significant interactions with the distribution of income. This point is 
interesting, as it seems to suggest that income distribution has political or, more precisely, 
fiscal policy implications under rather restrictive conditions: a left (or for that matter) a 
right-leaning government as such are not enough. The political orientation of government 
has to be wedded with the articulation of special interests.  
The appeal of this finding derives also from the fact that it seems to corroborate the 
intuition underlying the model by Cuckierman and Meltzer (1989) whereby a political 
process in which a government is voted into office by a majority of poor and liquidity 
constrained voters fiscal policy is likely to give rise to deficits as opposed to a government 
elected by rich and non-liquidity constrained voters (which would not run deficits). 
The second revealing interaction relates to political (in)stability. Our regression results 
suggest that if paired with political instability as measured by the number of anti-
government demonstrations and/or major upheavals such as ethnic conflicts, civil wars or 
regime crises, income inequality tends to weigh on the budget balance. The most likely 
interpretation of this result, which is fairly robust for the different sets of distribution data 
considered, is that income inequality does not translate into unfunded redistributive fiscal 
policies as long as the overall political situation is stable. In the face of major political 
protests or crises, however, income inequality seems to lead to higher deficits or lower 
surpluses most likely on the back of governments' attempts to calm the situation by handing 
out money to the less-well off. Interestingly, and not surprisingly, this political economy 
interaction seems to be significant only for major instabilities. It is not confirmed when 
                                                            
7 The corresponding variables are EXECR (-1=left, 0=centre, 1=right) and GOVSP (1= if largest party in 
government represents any special interests, 0= otherwise). 
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using indicators that capture less dramatic political changes such as the number of veto 
players (i.e. major institutional figures such as the prime minister or the president) that step 
down in a given year. 
Although less eloquent than the stories associated with the previous two interactions, the 
third type of interaction emerging from our panel regressions is potentially more serious 
because more important in practice. In particular, we find that inequality tends to dampen 
the impact of economic growth on the budget balance. The coefficient of the interaction 
term capturing the interplay between inequality and real GDP growth is negative and in 
most cases statistically significant. This effect goes on top of those associated with the 
political affiliation of government and political instability.  
As fiscal policy is often found to be asymmetric across the cycle (see for instance 
Balassone et al., 2008 and the European Commission, 2006) we have also tested separate 
dummies for positive and negative real GDP growth, the respective hypothesis being that 
inequality dampens the effect of economic growth on the budget more during expansions 
than during contractions.8 However, we do not find statistically significant evidence for this 
in the data. The hypothesis of equality of coefficients cannot be rejected at standard 
confidence levels. 
Nevertheless, taking into account that years of positive economic growth are more frequent 
than years of contraction, the dampening effect of inequality on the budgetary sensitivity 
with respect to growth can have a significant impact over time. For purely illustrative 
purposes, and using real GDP growth of the euro area, Figure 1 simulates the cumulated 
effect of real GDP growth on the budget balance for three different degrees of income 
inequality: a Gini coefficient of 28, which is about the average in our different data sources, 
and two alternative values of 33 and 25.9  
 
                                                            
8 The asymmetric behaviour over the cycle in combination with income inequality cannot be implemented for 
distribution data of EUROSTAT as the matrix of regressors is not well defined. 
9  Examples of countries with a GINI of 25 or less are Austria, Sweden and Norway. Examples of countries 
with a GINI of 33 and more are Greece, Portugal and the United Kingdom.  
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Figure 1: Cumulated effect of economic growth on the budget balance for different degrees of income 
inequality. 
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Over a period of about 15 years relatively small differences in the distribution of income - 
differences that are common in the EU - produce relatively large differences on the budget 
balance of about 4 to 5 percentage points of GDP. 
Why do countries with a pronounced inequality of income seems to benefit comparatively 
little from the additional government revenues accruing from economic growth? At this 
stage, and taking into account the aggregate level of our analysis, it is difficult to provide 
detailed answers to this question. An obvious conjecture relates to the typical political 
pressure to spend the revenues generated by economic growth. It is well possible that this 
pressure tends to increase with the degree of income inequality making it more difficult for 
policy makers to resist demands for higher spending or lower taxes. 
 
6. Summary and policy conclusions 
The pervasive tendency observed among developed and middle-income countries to run 
deficits across the cycle - the so called deficit bias – and, consequently, to accumulate 
government debt is predominantly attributed to the 'common pool' problem: geographically 
dispersed spending interests competing for government resources do not internalise costs 
for society as a whole and hence give rise to overspending. In this paper we examined an 
alternative explanation of the deficit bias, namely the distribution of income. Although 
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there are a number of theories that hypothesise an interplay between income inequality and 
fiscal performance, to our knowledge, the link has not been empirically tested so far in the 
economic literature. 
To address the quality issues generally signalled in connection with secondary distribution 
data – available data are not based on a commonly agreed methodology – we used 
measures of income inequality from different sources. The idea of using different datasets 
is that the comparison across sources allows us to assess the robustness of results.  
Our empirical analysis tends to corroborate the conjecture according to which income 
inequality makes fiscal discipline more difficult. In line with expectations, the link between 
income distribution and fiscal performance is not a direct one. Rather, interactions with 
political factors are at play. The first type of interaction relates to the political orientation 
and focus of governments. Inequality tends to weigh on public finances only when 
governments from the left of the political spectrum, which generally care more about equity 
issues, also represent special interests, conceivably those who benefit from deficit-financed 
redistribution. This finding is consistent with theoretical models according to which 
governments supported by a majority of poor and liquidity constrained voters will tend to 
run deficits. The second type of interaction is more straightforward and intuitive. It implies 
that income inequality will tend to lead to a deterioration of the budget balance when 
governments face political instability that puts their position at risk. The third, and 
somewhat less transparent, channel through which inequality seems to impinge on fiscal 
performance works in combination with economic growth: a higher degree of income 
inequality is associated with a muted impact of economic growth on the budget. One way to 
read this result is that political pressure to spend additional revenues accruing from growth 
mounts as the distribution of income becomes more uneven. 
These three main findings support observations and policy conclusions that seem to be 
relevant especially in the aftermath of the post-2007 global financial and economic crisis. 
First, the decision taken in some countries to impose higher taxes on those who purportedly 
benefitted excessively from the preceding economic progression - which turned out to be 
unsustainable – is primarily a move dictated by the political opportunity of the moment in 
view of the mounting dissatisfaction of some parts of the electorate with how the gains of 
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economic growth had been distributed. Nevertheless, consciously or not such decisions 
may also be grounded in the understanding that the prospective consolidation of dismal 
public finances could be much more difficult if politics turned a blind eye on the 
distribution of income. Our results suggest that inattention with respect to the distribution 
of income could trade off unfavourably giving rise to mounting political pressure for higher 
redistributive spending at a time when the priority is to reduce spending and to use 
additional revenues to improve the fiscal situation. Hence, when designing fiscal exit 
strategies for the medium to long run it may be worth assessing the distributional effects of 
alternative adjustment measures. A particular case in point are prospective pension reforms, 
which based on available assessments may contribute to sustainable public finances but 
imply very low pension levels for a growing number of older people. This type of risk is 
acknowledged in the 2009 Sustainability Report of the European Commission (2009). 
The more generalised conclusions would be that fiscal discipline is easier to safeguard in 
comparatively more even societies, as equality seems to moderate political pressures for 
overspending. 
 
 26
 
References 
 
Aghion, Ph., E. Caroli and C. Garcia-Penalosa (1999) Inequality and Economic Growth: 
The Perspective of New Growth Theories, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, No. 4, 
1615-1660. 
Alesina and Drazen (1991) Why are Stabilisations Delayed? American Economic Review, 
Vol. 81, No. 5: 1170-1188. 
Alesina, A. and R. Perotti (1995) the political Economy of Budget Deficits, IMF Staff 
Papers, Vol 42, No. 1: 1-31. 
Atkinson, A. B. (1997) Bringing Income Distribution in From the Cold, The Economic 
Journal, Vol. 107, No. 441, 297-321. 
Atkinson, A. B. and Brandolini, A. (2001). ‘Promise and Pitfalls in the Use of "Secondary" 
Data-Sets: Income Inequality in OECD Countries as a Case Study’. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 39(3): 771-799. 
Ballabriga, F., and C. Martinez-Mongay, C. (2002) Has EMU shifted policy? Economic 
papers of the European Commission. Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, No. 166. 
Balassone, F., M. Francese and S. Zotteri (2008) Cyclical Asymmetry in Fiscal Variables, 
Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No. 671. 
Barro, R. (1979) On the Determination of the Public Debt, Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 87. No. 5: 940-971. 
Buti, M. and P. van den Noord (2003) Discretionary Fiscal Policy and Elections, the 
Experience of the Early Years of EMU, OECD Economics Department Working Papers 
No. 351. 
 27
Cuckierman and Meltzer (1989) A political Theory of Government Debt and Deficit in a 
Neo-Ricardian Frame-work, The American Economic Review, Vol. 79, No. 4: 713-732. 
Deininger, K. and L. Squire (1996) A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality, World 
Bank Economic Review, Vol. 10, No. 3: 565-591. 
Dixit, A. and J. Londregan (1996) The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in 
Redistributive Politics, Journal of Politics, Vol. 58, No. 4: 1132-1155. 
European Commission (2009) Sustainability Report—2009, European Economy, Nr. 9. 
European Commission (2006). Public finance in EMU—2006, European Economy. 
Reports and studies, No. 3. 
Forni, L. and S. Momigliano (2004), ‘Cyclical Sensitivity of Fiscal Policies Based on Real-
Time Data’, Applied Economics Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 3: 299-326. 
Galí, J. and R. Perotti (2003) Fiscal policy and monetary integration in Europe, Economic 
Policy, Vol. 18, Issue 37: 533-572. 
Hsieh, C. T. (1997) Bargaining over Reform, European Economic Review, Vol. 44, No. 9: 
659-1676 
Manasse, P. (2006) Procyciclical fiscal policy: Shocks, rules, and institutions—A view 
from MARS, IMF working paper, Nr. 06/27. 
Tabellini, G. (1991) The Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 99, No. 2: 335-357. 
Meltzer, A. and S. Richard (1981) A Rational Theory of the Size of Government, Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 89: 914-927. 
Perotti, R. (1996) Growth, Income Distribution, and Democray: What the Data Say, Journal 
of economic Growth, Vol. 1, No. 2: 149-187. 
Pyatt, G. (2003). ‘Development and the Distribution of Living Standards: A Critique of the 
Evolving Data Base’, Review of Income and Wealth, Vol. 49, No. 3: 333-358. 
 28
Szekely, M. and Hilgert, M. (2002). ‘Inequality in Latin America during the 1990s’, in R. 
B. Freeman (ed.), Inequality Around the World. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Von Hagen, J. and I. Harden (1995) Budget Processes and Commitment To Fiscal 
Discipline, European Economic Review, Vol. 39, No. 3-4: 771-779. 
Von Hagen, J. (1992) Budgeting procedures and Fiscal Performance in the European 
Communities, European Economy – Economic Papers, No. 96. 
Von Hagen, J. and J. Poterba (1999) Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, NBER and 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
 29
 
Annex  
 
Data sources of income distribution 
 
UNU-WIDER 2008-update Gini coefficients: Selection of countries and years used in our empirical analysis
Country Country code Years No. of obs.
Average 
Gini 
coefficient
1 Austria AT 1970, 1972, 1976, 1977, 1981, 1983, 1987, 1991,  1994-2005   20 26.4
2 Australia AU 1960-1969, 1976, 1981, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1995-1998, 2000-2002, 2004 23 24.2
3 Belgium BE 1969, 1973, 1975-1977, 1979, 1985-1990, 1992-2001, 2003-2006 26 30.6
4 Canada CA 1961, 1965, 1967, 1969, 1971, 1973-1975, 1977, 1979-2000 31 29.8
5 Switzerland CH 1978, 1982, 1991, 1992, 1998, 2000-2002 8 33.1
6 Chile CL 1964, 1968, 1970-1992, 1994-1996, 1998-2000, 2003 32 51.6
7 Czech Republic CZ 1961-1966, 1968, 1970, 1973-1977, 1979-1981, 1983-1985, 1987-2006 39 21.1
8 Germany DE 1960, 1962, 1964, 1968-1970, 1973, 1975, 1978, 1980, 1983-2004 32 31.7
9 Denmark DK 1966, 1971, 1976, 1987, 1992, 2003-2006 9 33.9
10 Estonia EE 1981, 1986, 1988-1990, 1992-2006 20 33.9
11 Spain ES 1965, 1973, 1980, 1985, 1986, 1988-1990, 1994-2006 21 31.7
12 Finland FI 1962, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1985, 1987-2006 26 26.0
13 France FR 1962, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1989, 1990, 1994-2004 20 32.5
14 United Kingdom GB 1961-2003, 2005, 2006 45 28.2
15 Greece GR 1960-1974, 1979, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1991, 1993-2001, 2003-2006 33 39.1
16 Hungary HU 1962, 1964, 1967, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976-1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986-
1994, 1997, 1999-2001, 2005, 2006
28 24.4
17 Ireland IE 1973, 1980, 1987, 1994-2001, 2003-2006 15 32.9
18 Israel IL 1961, 1963, 1969, 1976, 1979, 1986, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001 10 38.9
19 Iceland IS 2004-2006 3 25.0
20 Italy IT 1967-1982, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995-2002, 2004-2006 32 35.1
21 Japan JP 1962-1965, 1967-1987, 1989, 1990, 1995, 1998 29 34.3
22 Republic of Korea KR 1961, 1964-1966, 1982-1985, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1995-1998, 2004 16 34.3
23 Luxembourg LU 1985, 1986, 1991, 1994-2001, 2003-2006 15 26.2
24 Mexico MX 1963, 1968-1970, 1975, 1977, 1984, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 
2002, 2004, 2005
16 53.1
25 The Nederlands NL 1962, 1967, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987-2003, 2005, 2006 26 29.3
26 Norway NO 1963, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1984-2001, 2003-2006 29 27.5
27 New Zealand NZ 1960, 1961, 1963-1978, 1980, 1982-1987, 1989-1992, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2001, 
2002, 2004
35 44.9
28 Poland PL 1960, 1962, 1964, 1966, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1976, 1978, 1980-2006 36 28.1
29 Portugal PT 1973, 1980, 1990, 1991, 1995-2001, 2004-2006 14 36.7
30 Russian Federation RU 1981, 1986, 1988-1991, 1994-2006 19 36.1
31 Sweden SE 1976-1986, 1989-2006 29 32.9
32 Slovenia SI 1990-2006 17 24.6
33 Slovakia SK 1987-2006 20 23.0
34 Turkey TR 1963, 1968, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1994, 2000 10 47.5
35 United States US 1960-2004 45 42.2
Total 829 32.64
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30
 
 
Gini coefficients from Deininger and Squire (1996): selection of countries and years used in our empirical analysis
Country Country code Years No. of obs. Mean Gini coefficient
1 Austria AT  -  -  - 
2 Australia AU 1969, 1976, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1990 9 37.88
3 Belgium BE 1979, 1985, 1988, 1992 4 27.01
4 Canada CA 1961, 1965, 1967, 1969, 1971, 1973-1975, 1977, 1979, 1981-1991 21 31.17
5 Switzerland CH - - -
6 Chile CL 1968, 1971, 1980, 1989, 1994 5 51.84
7 Czech Republic CZ 1965, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1977, 1980, 1981, 1985, 1988, 1991-199 13 22.67
8 Germany DE 1963, 1969, 1973, 1978, 1981, 1983, 1984 7 31.22
9 Denmark DK 1976, 1981, 1987, 1992 4 32.08
10 Estonia EE 1992, 1993, 1995 3 34.66
11 Spain ES 1965, 1973, 1980, 1985-1989 8 27.90
12 Finland FI 1966, 1971, 1977-1984, 1987, 1991 12 29.93
13 France FR 1962, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1979, 1984 6 42.13
14 United Kingdom GB 1961-1991 31 25.98
15 Greece GR 1974, 1981, 1988 3 34.53
16 Hungary HU 1962, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993 9 24.65
17 Ireland IE 1973, 1980, 1987 3 36.31
18 Israel IL - - -
19 Iceland IS - - -
20 Italy IT 1974-1984, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991 15 34.93
21 Japan JP 1962-1965, 1967-1982, 1985, 1989, 1990 23 34.82
22 Republic of Korea KR 1961, 1964-1966, 1968-1971, 1976, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1988 13 34.21
23 Luxembourg LU 1985 1 27.13
24 Mexico MX 1963, 1968, 1975, 1977, 1984, 1989, 1992 7 53.85
25 The Nederlands NL 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981-1983, 1985-1989, 1991 12 28.59
26 Norway NO 1962, 1967, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1984, 1986, 1991 8 34.21
27 New Zealand NZ 1973, 1975, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1985-1987, 1989, 199 12 34.36
28 Poland PL 1976, 1978-1993 17 25.69
29 Portugal PT 1973, 1980, 1990, 1991 4 37.44
30 Russian Federation RU - -  -
31 Sweden SE 1967, 1975, 1976, 1980-1990, 1992 15 31.63
32 Slovenia SI 1992, 1993 2 27.07
33 Slovakia SK 1992, 1993 2 20.49
34 Turkey TR 1968, 1973, 1987 3 50.36
35 United States US 1960-1991, 1987 33 35.49
Total 305 32.34
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Gini coefficients from the Luxembourg Income study: Selection of countries and years used in our empirical analysis
Country Country code Years
No. of 
obs.
Mean Gini 
coefficient
1 Austria AT 1987, 1994, 1995, 1997, 2000 5 26.14
2 Australia AU 1981, 1985, 1989, 1995, 2001, 2003 6 30.23
3 Belgium BE 1985, 1988, 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000 6 24.63
4 Canada CA 1971, 1975, 1981, 1987, 1991, 1994, 1997, 1998, 2000, 200 10 29.72
5 Switzerland CH 1982, 1992, 2000, 2002, 2004 5 28.76
6 Chile CL - - -
7 Czech Republic CZ 1992, 1996 2 23.30
8 Germany DE 1973, 1978, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1989, 1994, 2000 8 26.40
9 Denmark DK 1987, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2004 5 23.22
10 Estonia EE 2000 1 36.10
11 Spain ES 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000 4 32.75
12 Finland FI 1987, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2004 5 22.68
13 France FR 1979, 1981, 1984, 1989, 1994, 2000 6 28.77
14 United Kingdom GB 1969, 1974, 1979, 1986, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2004 9 31.32
15 Greece GR 1995, 2000 2 34.10
16 Hungary HU 1991, 1994, 1999 3 29.93
17 Ireland IE 1987, 1994-1996, 2000 5 32.70
18 Israel IL 1979, 1986, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005 6 32.80
19 Iceland IS - - -
20 Italy IT 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2004 9 32.50
21 Japan JP - - -
22 Republic of Korea KR 1981, 1986, 1991, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2005, 2006 8 28.45
23 Luxembourg LU 1985, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2004 6 24.98
24 Mexico MX 1984, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 9 47.56
25 The Nederlands NL 1983, 1987, 1991, 1994, 1999 5 25.40
26 Norway NO 1979, 1986, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2004 6 23.85
27 New Zealand NZ - - -
28 Poland PL 1986, 1992, 1995, 1999, 2004 5 29.44
29 Portugal PT - - -
30 Russian Federation RU 1992, 1995, 2000 3 42.53
31 Sweden SE 1967, 1975, 1981, 1987, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2005 8 22.86
32 Slovenia SI 1997, 1999 2 24.95
33 Slovakia SK 1992, 1996 2 21.50
34 Turkey TR - - -
35 United States US 1974, 1979, 1986, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2004 8 34.49
Total 159 29.70
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OECD decile ratios (D9/D1): Selection of countries and years used in our empirical analysis
Country Country code Years
No. of 
obs.
Mean 
decile ratio
1 Austria AT 2004-2007 4 3.29
2 Australia AU 1975-1995, 1997-2008 33 2.91
3 Belgium BE 1999-2006 8 2.40
4 Canada CA 1997-2008 12 3.66
5 Switzerland CH 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 6 2.55
6 Chile CL - - -
7 Czech Republic CZ 1997-2008 12 2.95
8 Germany DE 1984-2005 22 2.93
9 Denmark DK 1980-1990, 1996-2007 23 2.38
10 Estonia EE - - -
11 Spain ES 1995, 2002 2 3.88
12 Finland FI 1977, 1980, 1983, 1986-2007 25 2.44
13 France FR 1970-1998, 2000-2005 35 3.23
14 United Kingdom GB 1970-2008 39 3.34
15 Greece GR - - -
16 Hungary HU 1986, 1989, 1992-2006 17 4.02
17 Ireland IE 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003-2007 8 3.78
18 Israel IL - - -
19 Iceland IS - - -
20 Italy IT - - -
21 Japan JP 1975-2008 34 3.05
22 Republic of Korea KR 1884-2007 24 4.08
23 Luxembourg LU - - -
24 Mexico MX - - -
25 The Nederlands NL 1977-2005 29 2.67
26 Norway NO 1997-2002 6 2.01
27 New Zealand NZ 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994-2008 20 2.57
28 Poland PL 1992-1999, 2001, 2002, 2004 11 3.55
29 Portugal PT - - -
30 Russian Federation RU - - -
31 Sweden SE 1975, 1978, 1980-2004 27 2.15
32 Slovenia SI - - -
33 Slovakia SK - - -
34 Turkey TR - - -
35 United States US 1973-2008 36 4.29
Total 433 3.11
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EUROSTAT Gini coefficients: Selection of countries and years used in our empirical analysis
Country Country code Years No. of obs.
Mean Gini 
Coefficient
1 Austria AT 1995-2001, 2003-2008 13 25.5
2 Australia AU -  -  -
3 Belgium BE 1995-2001, 2003-2008 13 27.8
4 Canada CA -  -
5 Switzerland CH -  -
6 Chile CL -  -
7 Czech Republic CZ 2001, 2005-2008 5 25.2
8 Germany DE 1995-2001, 2005-2008 11 26.7
9 Denmark DK 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003-2008 10 23.0
10 Estonia EE 2000-2008 9 34.2
11 Spain ES 1995-2008 14 32.4
12 Finland FI 1996-2008 13 24.8
13 France FR 1995-2008 14 27.9
14 United Kingdom GB 1995-2003, 2005-2008 13 32.8
15 Greece GR 1995-2001, 2003-2008 13 33.9
16 Hungary HU 2000-2003, 2005-2008 8 26.8
17 Ireland IE 1995-2001, 2003-2008 13 31.7
18 Israel IL - -
19 Iceland IS 2004-2008 5 26.0
20 Italy IT 1995-2001, 2003-2008 12 31.3
21 Japan JP - -
22 Republic of Korea KR - -
23 Luxembourg LU - - 27.0
24 Mexico MX 1995-2003, 2005-2008 13
25 The Nederlands NL 1995-2003, 2005-2008 13 27.2
26 Norway NO 2003-2008 6 26.5
27 New Zealand NZ - -
28 Poland PL 2000, 2001, 2005-2008 6 32.2
29 Portugal PT 1995-2001, 2004-2008 12 36.8
30 Russian Federation RU - -
31 Sweden SE 1997, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004-2008 9 23.0
32 Slovenia SI 2000-2003, 2005-2008 8 22.8
33 Slovakia SK 2005-2008 4 25.5
34 Turkey TR 2002, 2003 2
35 United States US - - 45.5
Total 239 28.9
 
 
 Detailed definition of political variables used in our empirical analysis
Code Variable Description Source
EXECR Political affiliation of government 
(Dummy)
Party orientation with respect to economic policy: 1=right, parties that are defined as conservative, Christian democratic, or right-
wing; -1=left, parties that are defined as communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing; 0=centre, parties that are defined as 
centrist or when party position can best be described as centrist
World Bank DPI2006 Database of 
Political Institutions
LEGEL Legislative election  (Dummy) 1=there was a legislative election in this year; 0=otherwise World Bank DPI2006 Database of 
Political Institutions
GOVSP Government special interests (Dummy) 1=the party of the largest government party represents any special interests; 0=otherwise World Bank DPI2006 Database of 
Political Institutions
MAJ Margin of government majority 
(percent)
This is the fraction of seats held by the government. It is calculated by dividing the number of government seats by total 
(government plus opposition plus non-aligned) seats
World Bank DPI2006 Database of 
Political Institutions
HERFGO Herfindahl Index Government Index of party concentration in government. The sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in the government. An increase of the 
index singals higher party concentration.
World Bank
DPI2006 Database of Political 
Institutions
HERFOP Herfindahl Index Opposition Index of party concentration of opposition. The sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in opposition. An increase of the index 
singals higher party concentration.
World Bank DPI2006 Database of 
Political Institutions
HERFTO Herfindahl Index Total Calculated in the same manner as the Herfindahl Government and Herfindahl Opposition, but for full parliamentary spectrum. World Bank
DPI2006 Database of Political 
Institutions
STABS Political stability (Dummy) These variables counts the percent of veto players who drop from the government in any given year. Veto players are major 
institutional figures or institutions and are a function of the political system. Veto players can be the prime minister, the president, 
chambers of parliment etc.
World Bank
DPI2006 Database of Political 
Institutions
BNKV1052 Number of anti-government 
demonstrations
Anti-government demonstrations, lagged two years. Number of any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary 
purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-
foreign nature.  Derived from the daily files of The New York Times
Political Instability Task Force (PITF) 
Report, Center for Global Policy, George 
Mason University.
SFTPUHVL Number of annual maximum magnitude 
of all events in progress
Major political and social upheavals such as ethnic conflicts, civil wars, revolutionary wars or regime crises. The annual maximum 
magnitude of all such events in progress are summed over the prior 15 years.crises
Political Instability Task Force (PITF) 
Report, Center for Global Policy, George 
Mason University.
ECOFR Economic freedom  The key ingredients of economic freedom are: personal choice, voluntary exchange coordinated by markets, freedom to enter and 
compete in markets, protection of persons and their property from aggression by others. A detailed description of the construction 
of the indicator and its ingredients can be found at ....... A higher rating indicates a greater degree of economic freedom. As data 
were available only on a 5-year basis, we have interpolated data to have yearly data. 
The Fraser Institute 2009
 
